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Abstract
This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dic-
tator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but
instead expect the equal split division. We performed a field experiment
in Baja California among a population of unexperienced subjects. Using
monetary incentives we find that only 10 percent of subjects correctly
guessed the expected Nash equilibrium payoff (zero). In sharp contrast,
the modal subject predicts the equal split.
The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted
the zero contribution and 40% expected the equal split. Surprisingly, their
actions are uncorrelated with their predictions: they choose a donation
in the interior of the interval. We conjecture that the equal split is the
natural solution to the problem but because the dictators are involved,
they also consider the chance of keeping the complete pie for themselves.
Dictators solve the puzzle by passing a positive amount of money which
reflects the tension between fairness and self-interest. In consequence,
any giving smaller than the equal split division may not be considered
altruistic behavior. Only a donation larger than the 50/50 split would
reflect generosity.
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...the observed non-rational behavior in some (social) games, such
as the prisoner’s dilemma, might be explained simply by the framing
of the game. This frame triggers a social norm that the players are
accustomed to using when going about their everyday affairs.
Binmore (2006)
The literature regarding dictator games (DG for short) has shown two salient
results: i) a huge number of individuals deviate from the predicted Nash behav-
ior (donating zero); ii) on average, subjects donate around 10-20% of the total
endowment. In sum, they do not keep the complete pie but they are also far
from the equal split, i.e. the fair division. These discrepancies seem to reflect a
tension between selfishness and generosity.
Interestingly, it is well-established in the literature that the DG is a proper
tool for measuring altruism since subjects freely (and anonymously) decide over
making a donation or not. However, this interpretation has received criticism in
the past: Hoffman et al. [19] indicate that the observed altruism is just caused
by framing (a result clearly proven in Brañas-Garza [10] and to a much greater
extent in List [22]). In a another line, Frohlich et al. [18] consider that the
absence of social context — within a lab experiment— generates doubts which
explain the low level of generosity (a similar argument to Eckel & Grossman
[17])1 . Other authors claim that subjects donate due to the lack of anonymity
(see Bolton et al. [7])2. As Dana et al. [15] note:
For example, people in situations such as the dictator game might be
averse to appearing unfair, either to themselves or to others. Thus,
the underlying motivation driving much fair behavior observed in
experiments might be self-interest, coupled with a desire to maintain
the illusion of not being selfish.
Binmore [6] and Levitt and List [21] note that the properties of the situation
may trigger any social norm. According to Levitt and List [21], the power of
such norms move subjects’ choices far from the subgame-perfect refinement. For
Akerlof & Kranton [4] or Charness & Dufwenberg [13], subjects feel bad if they
do not follow the norm; an effect that will be potentiated by another salient
characteristic of the DG: “transparence” (see Dana et al. [15]). The dictator
clearly observes the consequences of his actions and responsibility is not easily
diffused.
Throughout this paper I offer experimental evidence of the salience (and the
limitations) of the equal split as the moral rule driving decisions in this game.
This rule has a notable effect on dictators’ behavior: they have to compare the
fulfillment of the rule with their own (selfish) interest.
1For a good survey of this literature see Meier [23].
2 Surprisingly, Dufwmberg and Muren [16] do not find any effect when dictators donate in
front of an auditorium crowded with people.
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To do so, I asked recipients how much money they expect3 to earn in the
DG, that is, how they expect dictators to divide the pie. To complete the puz-
zle, dictators were also asked (hypothetically) about the choices made by other
dictators. Hence, I obtained information about how people expect other people
to behave in the DG. I consider an advantage of expectations (vs. actions):
when subjects expect (rather than acting by themselves), certain considerations
such as personal involvement, property rights, etc... are not so strong. Thus,
we find that the actions are driven by more pure motivations.
Extreme care has been taken in the design so as to solve the problems noted
above. Following Hoffman et al. [19], I used neutral instructions in which
subjects were told that even keeping the whole pie was acceptable. To solve the
lack of social context (see Frohlich et al. [18] or Eckel & Grossman [17]) induced
in any regular lab experiment, I ran a single experimental session under similar
conditions to those of field experiments: unexperienced subjects doing real tasks
in the school auditorium. Finally, to give more relevance to the experimental
results I used a larger amount of money than previously used in the literature.4
The above modifications make these results more illustrative and credible.
Regarding the subjects’ tasks, the experimental design is simple and intu-
itive. First, twenty-eight 1st movers (dictators) completed the typical decision
task using a completely anonymous procedure involving envelopes. A question
about the behavior of other dictators was also included in the questionnaire
the subjects filled out at the end of the experiment. Once the first group had
finished, twenty-eight 2nd players (who had been waiting outside the room) en-
tered the same room. This second players were given the instructions that the
dictators had received and were asked to guess the amount of money they would
earn (as recipients). A scoring rule with monetary incentives motivated them
to make accurate guesses.
The results are substantive: i) only 3 recipients (out of 28) guessed the Nash
contribution (zero) and 35% of them (the modal value) predicted the equal split;
ii) 45% of the dictators predicted the zero contribution and 40% expected the
equal split.
My main claim is: if the equal split is the norm triggered by the DG, then
any donation smaller than the equal split is not altruism. On the contrary, this
deviation from the center (50/50) should be the consequence of the lack (or
lesser relevance) of social norms within the subjects’ utility function.
Following the introduction, the experimental design is explained in section
2, results are shown in section 3 and the contribution of this paper is discussed
in section 4.
3There are very few papers about expectations in dictatorial decisions. Aguiar et al. [1]
and [3] are references in this field.
4The whole size of the endowment was 200 Mexican pesos (' 15 US$ ' 14 Euros). Not
only is this amount of money 50% more than the general framework (10 US$), but we must
also consider the difference in terms of individual income plus cost of living in this (poor)
region of Mexico. For instance, 200 pesos is enough to buy 25 beers at any canteen in La Paz.
In Spain, this would cost no less than 37.5 euros (over 40 US$).
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2 Experimental design
To run the experiment I use very standard instructions (see additional materials)
avoiding words such as sharing which emphasize generous behavior. Moreover,
subjects received clues indicating that keeping the entire endowment was ex-
plicitly allowed.
Students were recruited by a professor of biology by means of posters placed
around the school. All of the posters read “Do you want to earn some money?”,
and provided an e-mail for participants to sign up. The entire recruitment
process was carried out the week prior to the experiment (performed Monday,
25 September 2006) while I was in Spain. On the day of the experiment, 56
subjects waited in the central plaza of the school near the auditorium. Twenty-
eight subjects were randomly selected as dictators, while the remaining subjects
were asked to wait for 15 minutes.
Dictators: The dictators received a package including a large brown envelope
containing another smaller white envelope inside (for dictators’ payoffs)5, ten
20-mexican peso bills ( 200 pesos' 15 US$ ' 14 euros) plus a survey and
instructions. The instructions explained the division problem and indicated
that the recipient would be randomly selected from among the participants
waiting outside.
After I read the instructions aloud, the subjects were instructed to do the
task privately with the help of the large envelope. They were told to place the
money they wished to keep (for themselves) in the small envelope, seal it and
put it in their pockets. The money they wished to donate (to the recipients)
had to remain in the big envelope.
Once they finished, they filled out a short survey. After this, they were asked
to give us the survey and sign a blank6 receipt form. They left the instructions
and the large envelope (with the donation) on their table.
Among other questions contained in the survey, dictators were asked about
their expectations regarding other dictators’ donations (item #4).7 I decided
to use this hypothetical survey instead of an incentivized guess (see recipients
section) to speed up the experiment.8
When the recipients were asked to come in, the dictators left by the back
door. Communication among them was impossible.
5A brown Columbian envelope measuring 25.4x33.0 cm. and a white Columbian envelope
measuring 10.5x24.1 cm.
6Given that donation was strictly confidential, we could not ask them to reveal the amount
of money they kept.
7 Item #4 says: With regard to the task (the division) —> what do you think the other
subjects have done?
8There is a second motivation for making the test hypothetical. Whereas each recipient
guesses the size of the donation he will receive, dictators are not matched to other dictators.
So naturally they will guess the average (except for themselves) donation of the dictators.
But the average is not an integer number.... and this fact would complicate comparisons. Our
strategy seems more simple and natural.
A final concern was about anonymity: how to keep it and pay dictators for their accurate
prediction?
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Recipients: Each of the 28 participants was seated 2 meters away from the
place where their respective dictator had been seated (and were he left the big
envelope). Recipients received the instructions (not the envelope) that their
corresponding dictators had left. I explained that these instructions belonged
to the previous participants and then read them aloud carefully. They also
received additional written instructions for their specific task.
The main task was then explained. They were informed that they would
get the money in the brown envelope for sure (whatever amount of money), but
that they also could earn an additional amount of money.
• 80 additional pesos if they guess the right number (of bills in the envelope)
• 20 if they fail by just one unit,
• otherwise, they will receive zero additional money.
Once they had finished guessing and put their choices aside, I went with
them to open the envelope and solve the game. I gave them the donation plus
80, 20 or 0 additional pesos. Afterwards they filled out a survey and signed a
regular receipt.
Why Mexico? There are three reasons: the first (main) reason why I chose
the Universidad Autonoma de Baja California Sur (UABCS) at La Paz (Mexico)
was that, as far as I knew, no one had ever run any experiments of this kind there.
The city of La Paz is 1000 miles from San Diego, thus the whole population was
completely unexperienced. This is relevant because subjects (both dictators
and recipients) may not have any well-documented prior knowledge about it.
I assumed that this lack of information was strictly necessary to achieve clean
results.
Second, I was interested in comparing these “real” results with lab evidence.
To do so, I used identical instructions to those used in experiments in Granada.
Thus, I needed a Spanish-speaking country.
Finally, I chose this (poor) region of Mexico because I was interested in
exploring “income effects”. The amount of money I used for the experiment
made a difference.
Replications: To check the robustness of our experiment we compared our
Mexican results with Spanish data.
• The dictatorial decisions arise from 27 Spanish students at the University
of Granada who participated in a DG experiment in January 2006 under
very close, but not identical conditions9 to those of the Mexican session.
• The Spanish data on guessing was collected in May 2008: I replicated the
guessing experiment at the University of Granada. I invited 27 students
(recruited by standard procedures) to the lab and followed a very similar
9Both use the same neutral instructions but differ in terms of some features. At the
University of Granada, subjects are familiar with experimental economics since we run a lot
of experiments, the session was conducted in the lab, and the amount of money was clearly
smaller (5 euros + a 2 euro show-up fee). More information is provided in Brañas-Garza [10].
5
procedure to the one in Mexico. When the students arrived at the lab they
found the experimental instructions and the donations made by Spanish
students during the previous dictator game (explained above). They were
asked to guess the donation contained in the envelope using the same
scoring rule (5 euros for right answers, 1 euro if they fail by just one unit,
0 otherwise), after which they received the donation.
3 Results
3.1 Dictators’ giving
The results are summarized in Table 1. The first column (Esp) reports the
giving in the DG experiment in Spain, whereas the second column contains the
Mexican donations (Mex). Although there are some differences (for instance,
the modal (median) value is 1 (2) for the Mexican sample and 2/3 (3) for the
Spanish sample), we see that the averages are nearly identical.
The Mann-Whitney test (Z = −0.43; p− value = 0.96) supports the above
affirmation. Thus, Mexicans and Spanish behave as if arising from the same
population.












Recall that there are major differences in terms of experience, credibility
and real size of the pie. It is clear that these variations do not affect dictators’
behavior. This first part of the experiment supports two clear ideas:
Result i : a) On average, dictators donate 25% of the endowment. b) Changes
in rewards and different experimental conditions do not vary behavior
dramatically in the DG.
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3.2 Recipients’ guesses
Table 2 reports the distribution of guesses made by the 28 recipients involved
in the experiment in Mexico (Mex) and the Spanish replication (Esp) with 27
subjects.
First, we observe that the Spanish results do not differ substantially from
the Mexican results: the modal, median and mean are practically identical. In
consequence, the Mann-Whitney test (Z = −0.26; p−value = 0.98) shows that
both samples arise from the same population.
Let us focus on the Mexican data. There are four impressive results: i) the
expected Nash equilibrium is predicted only in 3 cases; ii) in sharp contrast
three individuals expected to get more than half; iii) 10 subjects guessed the
equal split; and iv) on average, they expected to get 41% of the endowment.
According to the modal and the average value, it seems obvious that subjects
expect a division which is compatible with the equal split, but not with the Nash
equilibrium.


















Result ii : Recipients expect the equal split.
Although dictators systematically offer a minimal part of the pie, the recip-
ients do not expect that dictators will behave selfishly!
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3.3 Dictators’ expectations
The 28 dictators involved in the Mexican experiment were also asked to guess
what the other dictators would do, that is, to reveal their expectations about
dictator’s behavior. This information reveals what dictators believe that others,
on average, will donate. Nine subjects (out of 28) did not provide any answer.
First, we check if dictators’ predictions are based on their own actions. Sur-
prisingly we find that both variables are not correlated (LR − test = 14.09;
p− value = 0.82). Hence, they do not use their own behavior to form expecta-
tions about the behavior of others.
Second, we study dictators’ beliefs about other dictators. Figure 1 plots the
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Figure 1: Dictators predictions
Dictators expected that the other dictators would donate half10 or nothing.
This picture is completely different from what we found in both Table 1 (result
i) and Table 2 (result ii):
• In our experiment (like in most of the observed donations in standard
DGs), the observed donations are completely different. We usually find
very few 0’s and 5’s and many 2’s and 3’s.
• Moreover, this result largely contrasts with the predictions given by the
Mexican recipients (who expected 50/50).
In sum,
Result iii : Dictators expect either a zero contribution or the equal split.
The observed polarization suggests a sort of tension between social and selfish
motivations: “giving half or nothing” (see Dana et al. [15], see also Aguiar et
al. [2]).
This is consistent with the “involvement” arguments shown in Brañas et
al. [9]. They proved that the DG entails two simultaneous problems: first, the
dictator has to divide a pie between two persons (a distributional problem) and,
10The remaining 3 dictators guessed 1, 3 and 10, respectively. The average of the 19 obser-
vations is 2.59.
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secondly, the dictator is one of the two persons involved (a fair gamble). Hence,
the dictator should evaluate the cost of being fair when fairness is costly.
3.4 Summary of results
Throughout this research we find three interesting results:
• Recipients expect the equal split.
• Dictators expect both the Nash prediction and the equal split.
• Dictators offer some amount in between the zero and the equal split.
Given that the (moral or not) focal point of the equal split plays a crucial
role in the DG there are two clear questions to address: i) why dictators (vs.
recipients) add a new reference point: the zero? ii) why, when they solve the
decision problem, do most of them chose the middle of the interval?
4 Discussion
.... One central idea is to view a social norm as a moral expec-
tation, which people are inclined to live up to. We suggest that in
many cases guilt aversion can provide a form of microfoundation
for this. (...) guilt aversion may furnish an underlying motivation
for why people behave accordingly. There is a norm, it shapes the
server’s expectation, and the customer lives up to this expectation
because he would feel guilty if he did not.
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
When I began this research I was highly motivated by a number of new
papers reporting that generosity does not arise “only” from other-regarding
preferences, but also from self-centered preferences: subjects who lose part of
their identity if they do not fill the norm (see Akerlof and Kranton [4], Aguiar
et al. [3]); decision makers that experience guilt if they believe they let others
down (see Charness and Dufwenberg [13]); subjects who prefer to pay rather
than participating in unfair situations (see Dana et al. [14] or Brañas et al. [9]),
etc. The basic message of these papers is quite similar: subjects have a sort of
conscience (or a well endogeneized rule) that decides what is good/bad.
For Binmore [6], some games remind players of real situations. Similarly,
Levitt and List [21] argue that behavior is crucially linked not only to the
preferences of people, but also the properties of the situation. My view is: the
“0, 1,...,10”11 DG triggers the moral rule of the equal split.
11 In a decisive paper, List [22] shows that “−10,−9, ..., 0, 1, 2, ..., 10” DG explains a different
story: when the minimal allowed donation is negative (that is, taking money from the recipi-
ent’s endowment), the dictator changes the equal split criteria (5, 5) for other moral criteria:
neither taking nor passing money (10, 0). List [22] states: “the social norms of the game
change, providing the dictator with the “moral authority” to give nothing.”
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It is worth noting that the transparency of the game — there is a direct
link between dictator actions and the violation (or not) of the moral rule —
enormously facilitates the triggering of the moral rule.
“... the power of such norms can move choices consistently and
significantly away from the subgame-perfect refinement.” Levitt and
List [21]
In consequence, when I designed this experiment I was expecting “the equal
split as guessed behavior” for both dictators and recipients.12 I must admit that
I was impressed by the emergence of the Nash equilibria in dictators’ predictions
(result iii).
Throughout this discussion I will try to rationalize what I observed from
results i to iii. My conjecture is as follows: When any subject evaluates a
distributional problem —like the DG— they find a clear solution: the equal split.
This is consistent with the previous papers I cited above.
However, the comparison between recipients’ and dictators’ expectations (re-
sults ii and iii) lead me to think that this is true only ex-ante: the dictators’
involvement in the game changes the rules to be applied. When facing the prob-
lem, that is ex-post, dictators might consider not only the social rule (or the
identity), but also that they are the owners of the game (see Hoffman et al [20]).
Therefore when “they are part of the problem” the zero contribution emerges.
Once they evaluate the two possible solutions at hand — zero or half — they
solve the problem by offering a donation between zero and half.13 Observe that
in most cases they arrive at an interior solution: 0 < giving < 50/50 (result i).
Hence, I do consider that dictators face a tension between social rules and
pure selfishness. The most simple structure would be that dictatorial choices
are performed in two steps (see Figure 2).
12List [22] claims: “In the dictator game, the traditional action set invokes expectations
of the givers and receivers that seemingly “demand” a positive gift, since a zero transfer is
equivalent to being entirely selfish with money that an authoritative figure has just kindly
endowed.”
13 Interestingly, only 3 (out of 28) recipients correctly guessed the observed selfish behavior,
that is, most failed in their prediction. Since they are not involved in the game they just
consider the ex-ante situation where the moral rule applies. Hence, they largely consider that
dictators will play according to the equal split.
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Figure 2: Decision timing
step 1) Because of a moral rule, dictators should focus on the middle of the
interval when starting to solve this problem;
step 2) Second, selfish preferences drive dictators to move away from the
center of the interval: the larger the selfish preferences, the closer the solution
to zero.
This conjecture changes the standard interpretation of DG giving. Let us
assume that P is the total Pie and p ∈ [0, P ] any possible donation.
Definition 1 (selfish) 0 ≤ p < P/2 when subject egoism (partially) removes
moral rules.
Definition 2 (fair) p = p/2.
Definition 3 (altruism) p > p/2.
Under this classification any positive donation, but smaller than the equal
split (0 < p < p/2), would no longer be considered altruistic . We will interpret
this interior solution as the tension between selfish preferences and moral issues
(conscience, identity, etc.) within the subject’s utility function.
Our explanation is compatible with the model of other-regarding preferences
endowed with guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwemberg [12]). Our results in-
dicate that recipients expect the equal split. If dictators are aware of these
recipient expectations, then they would feel guilty if they move far from the
50− 50. In this case, dictators focus on the middle of the interval not because
of the rule of fairness, but because of expectations. We may interpret that any
positive giving (but smaller than the equal split) is the result of the intensity of
guilt in subjects’ preferences.
Finally, it is interesting to explore under which conditions subjects will give
more than half. A simple explanation could be that the equal split is only a
necessary condition: when the dictator-recipient comparison is not balanced, it
is possible to give more than their 50%. In Brañas-Garza [11] (where dictators
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donate to people in Africa), or in Eckel & Grossman [17] (where dictators donate
to the Red Cross), a large percentage of dictators donate more than 50%. In
these cases subjects may assume that the utility of the transferred money should
be higher than the utility of their own consumption.
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